Introduction. In early Septemher ] 940, the world was in a turmoil. The BatLle of Britain was nearing its climax, and elsewhere throughout the globe international tension ran high. Election year strife was just heginning to augment the furor of isolationist-interventionist clashes in the United States. This background provided a filling setting for the transmission of the following message to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 13 September: I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at W m;hington and the Seeretary of State on September 2, 1940, under whieh this GovernII1rnt has acquired the right to Ica!'r naval and air bases in Newfoundland, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, J amaiea, Sl. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua, and in British Guiana; also a copy of an opinion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940 , regarding my authority to cr>n-summate this arrangement.
The right to hases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are gifts-generously given and gladly received. Thc othcr hases mentioned have heen acquired in exchange for fifty of our old destroyers ... 1. This action by the President created a hcated controversy. Its legality and neutrality were openly questioned, and the sub rosa nature of .the associated negotiations was severely criticized. Howevcr, as dramatic events in Europe and activities of a national election began to dominate newspaper spaee, the furor aroused by the deal gradually suhsidcd.
Contemporary World Events. In ordcr to view the destroyers-naval basco 520 trade in proper perspective. a brief review of contemporary world events seems desirable.
From the time of the defeat of Poland until April J 940, the European conflict was ill a state of relative inactivity. On 9 April] 940, however, this temporary stalemate elided. Germany launched a blitzkrieg attaek on Norway and Denmark which appalled the world by its startling success. One month later, on 10 i\lav 19-1-0, the invasions of Belgium, ~iolland, Luxemhourg, and
France began. On the day thc Germans marched into th e Low COllntries, Nevillc Chamherlain resigned his post as Great Britain's Prime i\ linister. Jle was succeeded hy Winston Churchill, who immediately formed a new coalition Cahinet and prepared to lead his nation through its gravest crisis.
Meanwhile, the Nazi offensive made rapid advances. On 14 May the Duteh Army surrendered, and the German assault turned westward toward the classic battlefields of northern France. Armored mobile columns cut through north of the Somme to the English Channel. From therc they proeeeded northeastward to the Channel portswithin sight of Britain itself. I n only 11 days the Germans had a('compli!'hcd what they had failed to do in 4 On the following day, Will!lton Churchill sent President Roosevelt au even more breathtaking request. Titling himself "Former Naval Person," he wrotc:
All I ask now is that you should proclaim non-belligerency, which would mean that you would help IlS with everything short of actually engaging armed forces. Immediate needs are: First of all, thc loan of forty or fifty of your older destroyers ... 4 This cahle from Chun:hill ww; tlw first he had sent to Roosevelt since becoming Prime Minister. It was also the first of a series whieh dealt with the subject of procuring American destroyers. These messages were to have considerahle influence on consummating the trade. I have already cabled you about aeroplanes including flying boats which are so needful to us in the impending struggle for the life of Great Britain. But even more pressing is the need for destroyers. Italian outrage makes it necessary for us to cope with much larger number of submarines which may come out into the Atlantic and perhaps be based on Spanish ports. To this the only counlcr is deslroyers. Nothing is so important as for us to have 30 or 40 old destroyers you have already had reconditioned. We ean fit them very rapidly with our asdics and they wiII bridge over the gap of 6 months before our wartime new construction comes into play. We will return them or their equivalents to you without fail at 6 months notice if at any time you need them. The next 6 months are vital ... Not a day should be lost. Never cease to impress on President and others that, if this country were successfully invaded and largely occupied after heavy fighting, some Quisling Government would be formed to make peace on the basis of our becoming a German Protectorate. In this case the British Fleet would be the solid contribution with which this Peace Government would huy terms.
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These references to loss of Lhe British Fleet served to bring England's crisis closer to American thoughts. With the world's largest navy at its disposal, Germany might actually expand the war to the shores of the United States.
A Trade is Conceived. The news that Britain was seeking American destroyers somehow leaked out to the press, and expressions of opinion on the subject began to appear. 3 On 12 June Ernest K. Lindley, writing in his column for the Washington Post and other newspapers, suggested America run the risk of violating international law by convoying ships to England or, failing that, by "selling a flock of old destroyers to the British. ,,14 Public opinion was not as y~t very strong on the subject, however, largely through indifference and lack of information.
Within the administration, the possibility of tran~ferring some destroyers now hegan to be given more consideration. In early July, Joseph Alsop, another Washington correspondent, was a guest for dinner at the British Embassy. A staff member confided to him some of the contents of Churchill's urgent appeals to Roosevelt for destroyers. Alsop, in turn, urged Benjamin Cohen, special assistant to the Attorney General, to use all his influence in support of the lransf er of ;'0 or 60 sueh warships to England. From his information he fell that, without such naval reinforcement, Britain might not be able to hold the Channel against invasion. 1 5 Cohen brought this idea to Harold Ickes, who. on 5 J nly "spent a lot of time arguing with the President that, hy hook or by crook, we oUfht to aeecdc to England's request. "1 Roosevelt, however, was now bound by the National Defense Aet of 28 June 1940. In reply to Ickes, he stated that the destroyers eould not be transferred without a certification from the Navy that they were useless for defense purposes. In addition, he felt that such an action would be difficult since the Navy was reconditioning more than 100 of them for its own usc. 1 7 For the United States, however, the ramifications of a possible surrender of the British Fleet now began to assume grea ter significance. Lord Lothian cabled Churchill on 6 July that American opinion was becoming aware of this eventuality.IS Among the White House advisers this fear also increased in magnitude. There was general agreement in the administration that some means Illust be found to bolster Britain's sea defenses. But a feasible method to do this was not immediately apparent. Statutes and congressional opposition stood in the way.
The temporary impasse was ended in late July. For some time the Navy had been anxious to obtain sea and air bases on islands in the Atlantic and Caribbean. These were desired to safeguard approaches to the Panama Canal and strengthen hemispheric defense. Since Britain held title to certain islands which would be suited for this purpose, the administration conceived the idea to arrange some sort of exchange.
On 23 July President Roosevelt discussed this idea with Secretary of the Navy Knox. The President expressed opposition to taking title to the h;lands, thl·n·by inhl·riting their political, l'lhnie, and l'(!OnOlllic prohh·IlI~. lit· pn'ferre'd to a:;k the Brith;h and Colonial Governmrnts to Ir:lsc till' sill':;.19 Roosevelt made no attempt to specify the terms of 523 such agreements, hecause he felt these could be arranged Inter. The President asked Colonel Knox, who wm; dining with Lord Lothian that evening, to sound him out on the proposal. Lo--thian, in turn, was expected to get the concurrelH:e of Churchill. With a basis for negotiations thus established, the trade began to develop more rapidly.
Negotiations Begin. On 31 July Churchill again cabled Roosevelt directly:
It has now become most urgent for you to let us have the destroyers ... for which we have asked ... We have a large construction of destroyers and anti-U-hoat craft corning forward, but the next 3 or 4 months open the gap of which I _have previously told you. Latterly the air attack on our shores has become injurious ... Destroyers are frightfully vulnerable to air bombing, and yet they must be held in the air bombing area to prevent seaborne invasion ... This is a frank account of our present situation and I am confident, now that you know exactly how we stand, that you will-Ieavc nothing undonc to ensure that 50 or 60 of your oldest destroyers are sent to me at once ... Mr. President, with great respect, I must tell you that in the long history of the world this is a thing to do now .
•. 20 By this time Churchill's pleas were receiving more attention. At the Cabinet meeting on 2 August, the transfer of destroyers was discussed at length. In Roo~evelt'~ own words, there was imJllI!diatl' agn'('nll!nt that "tlw survival of IIII! Brili~h Isles lIIuler (;('rnulII all;u:k might vcry possibly (lepeJld OJI geLLiJlg Ih('s(' de~lroyers." But he al~o recognized that Icgislation would be "necessary" to authorize any deal concerning the warships. The President felt that, if the British Government would give positive assurances that the British Fleet ... "would not under any conceivable circumstances fall into the hands of the Germans," the opposition in Congress would be "greatly lessened."21
By early August the domestic political situation had also changed favorably for approval of the destroyer transfer. In June the Republican Convention had broken with isolationist control. The delegates had nominated an avowed internationalist, Wendell WiIlkie, whose ideas on assistance to Britain were "all aid short of war." In July, Roosevelt had accepted an unprecedented third term nomination. Both parties now attempted to appeal to the pro-English sentiment of the voters.
In order to facilitate passage of the necessary legislation through Congress, the Cabinet decided at the 2 August meeting to sound out W illkie's views on the transfer. Roosevelt agreed to call William Allen White, noted editor and head of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. White, who was friendly with WilIkie, was to seek his approval, together with that of Repuhlican congressional leaders, and thus reduce the opposition to the measure. ... It would obviously be impossible for us to make or agree to any declaration being made on such a subject. I have repeatedly warned you in my secret telegrams and those to the President of the dangers United States would run if 'Great Britain were successfully invaded and a British Quisling Govc'rIIment came into office to make the best terms possible for the surviving inhabitants. 1 am very glad to find that these dangers are regarded tis serious, and you should in no wise minimize them. We have no intention of relieving United States from any well grounded anxieties on this point ... Pray make i~ dear at once thnt we could never ngree to the Iilighl\!IiL (:Olllpromising of our full liherty of ac~tion, nor tolerate any slH:h dc'-fentist llllnouncement, the effeet of which would be disastrous ... 2S
These developments limited the alternatives for any proposed destroyersnaval bases trade. Transfer of the warships was now coupled with the lease of sites for naval and air bases in the Caribbean and Atlantic.
Public Opinion Rises. i\ !though preliminary negotiations on the df'stroyer deal were ostensihly slLb ro.~a, the possibility of such llction was wioely known by early August. Attention was focused on the suhjeet on 4 August, when Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander of the American Expcditionary Force in World War I, addressed the country on a nationwide radio broadcast. Pershing had been induced to make the speech by William Allen White's Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. 26 He warned that "all the things wc hold dear arc gravely threatened," and stated that thc best way for the nation to defend its heritage before it was too late was to aid Britain in every way within its power. The old warrior believed that this could be done immediately by providing the British or Canadian Governments "at least fifty of the overage destroyers which arc left from the days of the World War. " 27 The urgency of Britain's needs tended to change the opinion of certain influential Americans concerning the proposed warship transfer. Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Committce on Foreign Relations, announced his support of the plan. In June, after the fall of France, he had been so sure that England would also topple before the German onslaught that he deprecated "futile encouragemcnt to fight on," and advised the Churchill government to abandon the British Isles to Hitler and bring its navy across the Atlantie. 28 Further evidences of popular support for the idea were also brought forward. Senator Alben Barkley, the administration's Senate leader, presented a petition signed by approximately 15 Probably the most significant survey of public opinion on the subject was a Gallup poll published in August. It pointed out that England needed destroyer ships to replace those which had bee~ damaged or sunk and that the United States had some destroyers built during the last World War which were being put back into active service. Questioned whether the United States should sell some of these ships to England, the Gallup respondents re~lied: Yes, 61 percent; No, 39 percent. 1 But all sentiment on the destroyer transfer was not favorable. Senator David Walsh was convinced that releases of the ships would not only violate Federal law but would be an act of war. There wcre also reports that high officers in the Navy Department believed that transfer of the vessels would weaken national defense.
A different sort of objection was raised by the Dallas News. It was concerned with the secrecy surrounding the entire transaction. In an open letter to President Roosevelt, the paper stated:
... No citizen of this 'country can be disinterested in the effect on our future of a defeat for Great Britain ... Aid-the most effective aid that the U.S. can render without impairing our own national defense-may be unpopular at the moment because men and women do not understand thc dire necessity. But if they were told, sir, thcir support and their conviction would be immediatc in responsc. 32
TIIi~ increa~ed puhlie illtere~l ill the destroycr trllnsfer tcnded to impart grcatcr urgency to the negotiations.
Progress is Made. As previously mentioned, Roosevelt had decided to ascertain Willkie's opinions on thc warship transfcr before bringing the necessary legislation before Congress. William Allen White had been designated to contact the Repuhlican candidate on this subject. Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress and member of the White House circle, was also involved. MacLeish was friendly with Russell Davenport, WiIlkie's campaign manager, and acted through him in an attempt to secure prior approval for the deal. i\ lacLeish and White succeeded in determining that Willkie privatcly approved of the destroyer transfer and would not make a campaign issue of it. 33 But the Republican candidate failed to give the administration a blank check in negotiations, even though he a, jJroved of the ob;~ctive.34 He hesitated to commit h .
• nself completely while the entire subject was still cloaked with secrecy.
With the threat of partisan attack on the exchange thus diminished. the administration proceeded with negotia-
tions. On 4 August Secretary of State
Cordell Hull met with Lothian and discussed England's urgent need for the destroyers. Hull reemphasized the legal difficulties and probable time delays inherent in such a transaction, but reassured the' British Amhassador the United States was I!;iving the matter "attentive consideration."3 5 The same day Hull sent to the President a memorandum relating to the sale of the warships and auxiliary vessels. I t (~n closed a proposed draft of a hill to be offered in Congress which would specifically authorize such sale. This draft had heen prepared on 2 August hy Green II. Hackworth, Legal Adviser of the Slate Department, and it had been approved by Judge Townsend of the Department of.J ustil'e. In di"l'usging thi" proposed hill with Roosevelt, howeVl'r, the President and II ull agreed that there might be two ohjectlOns to sending it to Congress-one, thiit it wouid ~tir up ., considerable. isolationist antagonism j the other, that many weeks of diseuH.~ion m igh t pass hdore it eCluld be adopted. 36 Leaving the talks at this preliminary stage, Hull left for Georgia on vacation. His place was taken by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles.
At this juncture several members of the Cabinet, notably Attorney General Robert Jackson, vigorously supported by Secretary of War Stimson, persuaded Roosevelt that he need not submit the plan to Congress. Two weeks previously, on 22 July, Benjamin Cohen had transmitted a memorandum to the President, via Harold Ickes, which advocated similar action. At that time, however, Roosevclt "frankly doubted if Cohen's memorandum would stand up.,,3 7 As time passed, however, these doubts dissolved under the increasing pressure from Churchill, particularly with respect to the possible loss of the British Fleet.
On 13 August the initial framework of a tentative trade agreement was developed during a conference between the President, Secretaries Knox, Stimson, and Morgenthau, and Under Sreretary Welles. Hoosevell cabled this proposal to Churchill the same day:
... I t is my helief that it may he possihle to furnish to the Brith:h Government as immediate a!'."isLance at least 50 destroyers ... it would be necessary, in ·the event that it proves possible to release the material above mentioned, that the British Government find itself willing to take the following two steps:
I. Agguranec on the purt of the Prime lVlinister that in tlw (Wl'nt thut the wull'rs of Grt'llt Brituin il('('omc nnll'nahlt, for British ships of war, the lall('r would not he turned over to the Germans or sunk, hut wonld he gent to other parts of the Empire for continued defense of the empire.
2. An agreement on the part of Great Britain that the British Government would authorize the usc of Newfoundland, Bermuda, the BlIhamas, J aJllaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana as naval and air hases by the United States ... with the understanding that the land necessary for the above could be acquired by the United States through purchase or through a 99-year lease. Churchill replied affirmativcly to Roosevelt's proposal on 15 August:
We can meet both the points you consider necessary to help you with Congress and with others concerned, but I am sure you will not misunderstand me if I sav that our willingness to do so m{lst he conditioned on our being assured that there will be no delay in letting us have the ships. Tlw groundwork for the rx("han~e was now completed. During his 16 August press conference, Rooscvelt made the first official statemcnt that discussions were taking place: "The United States Government is holding eonverf'ations with the Government of the British Empire with regard to acquisition of naval and air baf'es for the defense of the Western Hemisphere and especially the Panama Canal ... ,>4 0
No mention was madc of a pOf'f'ihle deal for destroyers. These negotiations continucd to be shrouded in sccrecy, and several obstacles remained to be surmounted before the trade could be completed.
Obstacles. The fin;t major prohlem hindering further progress conccrncd the legality, under intcrnationallaw, for a neutral state to transfer warships to a 527 belligerent nation and, even more important, whether the President could do so without the approval of Congress. As previously mentioned, both the Attorney General and his assistant, Benjamin Cohen, had assured Roosevelt that such action was within his Icgal powers.
Realizing that suhmission of thc proposed trade agreement to Congress would arouse considerable isolationist opposition and that time delays were inevitable in such a procedure, the President requested Attorney General Jackson to prepare a formal ruling on the subject. In respect to the naval bases-destroyer exehange, Jackson was asked to render a legal opinion on two questions: (I) whether such an acquisition could he concluded hy the Prcsident as an executive agreement, and (2) whether the President had authority to alienate title to such ships, and, if so, on what eonditions. 41 In an eight-page ruling delivered to Rooscvelt on 27 August, the Attorncy General reviewed the question in light of existing statutes and advised the President that: (1) the proposed arrangcment could be eoncluded as an eXI:("utiv(! agn'clllcnt, and (~) there WllS prcsidential powcr to transfer title and possession of the proposcd considerations upon certification hy appropriate 5ta rr officers. 4 2 In hlllHling down this opinion, the Attorney General held that the Prcsident was legally empowered to effect the acquisition of the bases by exeeutive agreement, first, because as constitutional Commander in Chief he was responsible for the maintenance of all agencies of national defense at their highest efficiency; and second, because the conduct of foreign relations was vested in the President hy the Constitution as part of the executive functioll. the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to engage in belligerent operations, if the vessel were specially adapted within the neutral's jurisdiction to warlike use, Jackson also had an answer. He ruled that these restrictions did not apply "to vessels like the overage destroyers, which were not built, armed, equipped as, or converted into, vessels of war with the intent that they should enter the service of a belligerent. , >44 The second major snag in negotiations arose when Churchill balked at the idea of a straight trade, destroyers for bases. His immediate prohlem eoncerned domestic politics. He realized that, ill order to faeilitate the exchange, Roosevelt would allempt to make it appear favorable to the United States. Thus the Prime Minister ran the risk of being held up as soft, as having been outwitted by the Yankees. 4 5 In Churchill's words:
The President ... was of course increasingly drawn to present the transaction to his fellow-countrymen as a highly advantageous bargain wherehy immense securities were gained in these dangerous times by the United States in return for a few flotillas of obsolete destroyers. This was indeed true; but not exactly a convenient statement for m·e. Deep feelings were aroused in Parliament and the Government at the idea of leasing any part of these historie territories, and if thc issue were presented to the British as a naked trading-away of British possessions for the sake of fifty destroyers it would certainly encounter vehement opposition. I sought, thereforc, to place the transaction on the highest level, wherc indeed it had a right to stand, b(~('mlse it exprcssed and conserved the enduring common interests of the English-speaking world. 46 By "place the transaction on the highest level," Churchill meant an outright gift of the base sites to the United States, ostensibly in return for a free gift of the destroyers. On this basis, negotiations proceeded.
Meanwhile, a statement by the British Prime Minister served further to hinder progress. On 20 August Churchill made a report to Parliament on the war situation to date. In it he not only omitted any reference to the destroyers, but pointedly disassociated the bases question from any other consideration. While Roosevelt had hoped that the Prime Minister would prepare his public for acceptance of the American froposal, what he did was the reverse. It is the fact that we had decided in Cabinet to offer you naval and air facilities off the Atlantic coast quite independently of destroyers or any other aid. ,>4 8
The next day Lothian cabled the Prime Minister that Sumner Welles had told him it was "ullerly impossihle for the President to send the destroyers as a spontaneous gift; the: could come only as a quid pro quo. ,>4 The situation was now at a temporary impasse.
At this juncture Secretary of State Hull returned to Washington. On 23 A ugust at a meeting of the Cahinet, the President told him: "Our negotiations with Britain on the bases and destroyers have boglicd down. Please see what you can do." 0 Almost immediately lIull commenced a study of the difficulties so far encountered. He reviewed in a meeting with Lothian and Roosevelt the entire progress of negotiations to date.
On the morning of 26 August, Hull met with Green H. Hackworth, Legal Adviser of the State Department, and Judge Townsend of the Department of Justice. The three men sought SOIlW means to end the impasse. After a short discussion, Hackworth suggested that there might be a compromise between Churchill's desire for reciprocal gifts and the legal position binding the President to get something in return fpr the destroyers. s 1 His idca was that Britain could lease sites on Newfoundland and Bermuda as outright gifts, while the Caribbean bases were leased in consideration for the cession of 50 destroyers.
Hull transmitted this proposal to the President, who gave it his tentative approval. The following day, after a Cabinet meeting, Roosevelt held a special session with Secretaries Knox, Stimson, and Hull. The four men went over the initial draft carefully, made a few changes in phraseology, and then approved it. That night the proposal was reviewed again by another group.
In addition to Hull and Knox, this meeting was attended by Adm. Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, who had to certify under the act of 28 June that the destroyers were not essential to national defense, and Lord Lothian. 52 Once more the draft was approved.
Lothian transmitted this proposal to London. Churchill's 29 August reply differed in only a few details from the American version, notably in the addition of Antigua as a base site. The Prime Minister stated:
We are prepared in friendship and good will to meet your representatives forthwith, in order to consider the lease for ninety-nine years of areas for the establishment of naval and air bases in the following places: It certainly does. I must, however, observe that these hypothetical contingencies seem more likely to concern the German Fleet or what is left of it than our own. 5 4 Consummation. The obstacles to consummation of the destroyer deal were now largely overcome. A final text of the agreement was prepared and approved. Admiral Stark gave it his certification. At the State Department a message for the President to send to Congress was drafted. Notes confirming the destroyer-bases transaction were exchanged on 2 Septcmber betwecn Hull and Lothian. On 3 September the President's message together with the destroyer-bases notes and tbe opinion hy the Attorney General concerning the legality of the transaction were communicated to Congress.
After nearly 4 months of negotiatiolls, the trade was completed.
